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Although the distinction is useful in illuminating some of the media dynamics of revolutionary Iran, I would like to propose that with respect to public writing, the labels big and small, or major and minor, are misleading, both because numerous agents make use of itstates, municipal bureaucracies, corporations, voluntary associations, and individuals (Illus. 2) -and because these labels imply that public writing is culturally secondary to hegemonic, high-capitalhigh-technology media. It is not always clear just how the messages, the audiences or the sponsors of big and small media differ from one another. What is clear is that public writing coexists with, refers to, feeds off of, and reciprocally constitutes the rest of the media environment. Consumers tend to perceive this environment as relatively undifferentiated. They often have difficulty, for example, remembering the association between specific advertising campaigns and particular products, and do not necessarily draw sharp distinctions between different channels of communication (Schudson 1984) .
What does monumental public writing do? Here is a striking thought experiment from philosopher Jean Baudrillard:
Let us imagine for the moment modem cities stripped of all their signs, with walls bare like a guiltless conscience ... And then GARAP appears. This single expression, GARAP, is inscribed on all the walls: pure signifier, without a signified, signifying itself. It is read, discussed, and interpreted to no end. Signified despite itself, it is consumed as a sign. What does it signify, if not a society ca- Baudrillard's notion of modem society as a hyperreality -an environment of signs which signify nothing but themselves -has been criticized for a number of reasons (e.g. Bruner 1994), not least because it appears to assume that all signs have an advertising function, which they do not. Single signs may have multiple functions as well as multiple physical aspects which lend them complex properties. This is not to say that there are no pure signs in Baudrillard's sense, but before we look for them, we should survey the variety of signs one does find in urban Egypt.
Signs can be directions for the use of urban spaces: labels on buildings, street and traffic signs. They can be orientations to the special ethos or changing character of local communities: in some neighbourhoods in Cairo one finds neatly hand-lettered signs affixed to lamp posts announcing 'Obedience to God is through Modest Dress', or 'Modest Dress is your Path to Paradise'. These are signs-about-signs, metasigns placed by men to warn women about the limits of their own deployment of signifying dress. There are few places you can stand in Cairo and not see, somewhere, the name of God. On the roofs of the Corniche headquarters of the National Democratic Party, military Officer's Club complexes, and the administration building at al-Azhar university, metre-tall letters in green neon spell out the name of Allah. Municipal governments and private corporations have lined the median strips of major avenues with signs displaying the divine name in decorated Kufic script, and along the river between the Cleopatra Hotel and the National Circus, a small pharmacy bears no other name on the lighted plastic sign above its door than 'Allahu akbar' -'God is Great' (Illus. You have sex all the time. Everything is OK in heaven, but not here! I mean, either a thing is right, or it's wrong, you know? Who do they think they're trying to kid with this stuff? His parody of the Muslim image of heaven as a sensual paradise was not a product of ignorance (it would not have been a parody otherwise), but of unbelief, his response to a discussion among religious scholars he had heard on his FIAT's radio earlier that day. If asked to explain what Muslims 'really' believe heaven is like, he would have been able to give a perfectly acceptable answer; he simply would not have attributed any truth to it. But far from indicating the impotence of public religious culture in modem Egypt, this example illustrates, on the contrary, its power to intrude on the consciousness and animate the imagination of even the non-religious, whose personal beliefs might disagree with official dogma.5
Saying that religion is familiar to all Egyptians is more than just to assert, as Leftist politicians are fond of doing, that 'The masses speak the language of religion to express themselves politically'. That statement carries with it a cluster of tacit assumptions about the linkage between social structure and ideology which rest more on political than sociological considerations and which obscure recent changes in the way Egyptians relate to their religious heritage. It assumes both that the masses, trapped in a pre-secular state, are awaiting eventual enlightenment, and that the privileged classes are immune to religious ideology. In fact, neither is true. While specific religious practices may be class stratified, there is little predictable correlation between class standing and religious commitment or interest, either in Egypt or in Europe (Bourdieu 1984:111). The current revival of religious interest in Egypt cuts across class lines and represents far more than merely an oppositional political movement. During the 1980s, for example, enrolment increases in the Islamic faculties at Egyptian universities far outstripped overall enrolment growth in the Arts and Humanities, the circulation of public-sector religious periodicals more than doubled, and surveys of elite Cairo University students showed that both males and females overwhelmingly favoured 'modest dress', or higab, for women (Starrett 1991: 9).6
If we are to make sense of this religious awakening, we cannot dismiss religious concerns as benighted survivals of earlier social stages, or 'inflammations' symptomatic of social pathology (Kepel 1985: 22). Instead, we must see them as perennial questions which persist in an active manner, adapting and reproducing themselves within and between generations through increasingly complex interactions with institutions and communications media whose own advent, according to Euro-American social philosophy, was supposed to reduce rather than increase the influence of 'traditional' ideas in society.
The Islamic content of the mass media (Abu-Lughod 1993), mass schooling (Starrett 1991) and public space is just one aspect of the general process through which Islam and secular institutions have embraced one another. But it contributes to making that embrace. a mutual choke-hold that won't allow either to escape again unharmed. On the one hand, every one of the major political parties in the country has been scrambling for the support of the partisans of the religious awakening since it became apparent that catering to religious concerns delivers votes.7 Once having committed themselves to Islamic rhetoric, it may be difficult for any of them to pull back from promoting an Islamic future for Egypt. On the other hand, the sacred tradition has also committed itself fully to the products and processes of secular life, a retreat from which might be even more threatening.
A cynic might look at the roadsign advertising cam- paign that Olympic Electric has waged along the CairoAlexandria road, with its ritual phrases mounted above salespitches for fans and water heaters, and say that the company was greedily capitalizing on religious sentiment to hawk its products. But it is perhaps more interesting to approach the campaign from the opposite direction, looking at how this familiar God-talk has succeeded in spreading itself between the two cities by hitchhiking on the back of a commercial vehicle and capitalizing on the human desire for temperature control. The idea of religious culture exploiting profane institutions is not as strange as it first seems. It merely requires the recognition that, in literate societies, ideas are physical objects that can be manipulated and juxtaposed in ways that have less to do with their internal logic than with their practical possibilities. Expressed in words and pictures, ideas are printed, distributed, traded, bought and sold, consulted and stored in material form, which means that ideas that do not find expression in the widest possible number and range of physical manifestations will find themselves quickly overwhelmed by others that do, drowning in a white noise of competing claims. When rejected en masse, as a matter of ideological change, fashion, security concerns, or political protest, ideas are disposed of in material form as well: in book and record burnings, secret document shreddings, the trading-in of old royal or sacred images for new ones. But the more firmly entrenched those ideas are in public space, the more difficult it is to dispose of them, and the more pervasive their influence. Islam is now making full use of the communications revolution and manifests itself in every conceivable medium, saturating the physical environment with messages that are not without effect. Recall Durkheim's poetic description of the interchange between human beings and their surroundings:
... the external world echoes inside of us; it is prolonged in us in the same way that we overflow into it. Things, beings from the outside, penetrate into our consciousness, mingle intimately in our inner lives, become entwined in our existence, and, conversely, we merge our existence with theirs. Our ideas, our sentiments, pass from our minds to others and vice versa. There is in us something other than ourselves, and we are not entire in ourselves; there is also something of us in the objects that become assimilated, or that we assimilate, into our lives [Durkheim 1973:216 Illus. 12, for example, is not a conscious inscription of God's name, but a discovery of His name in a seemingly neutral artefact. Its presence on the fence around an American institution heightens rather than ditninishes its significance, for it shows that God directs even non-believers to reiterate his signs in the world. Likewise, one will occasionally find photographs in Muslim periodicals of honeycombs in which the bees have blocked off cells to spell the divine name, or 'Allah' inscribed by natural blight on the surface of a leaf. In the summer of 1993 I found a particularly good example of this convention on the wall of a Cairo juice bar. The proprietor had taped up a double-page spread from a private-sector religious periodical purporting to be a photograph of a grove of trees, the trunks of which had naturally grown into the shape of Arabic letters spelling the shahada: 'There is no God but God, and Muhammad is His Messenger' (see Foucault 1970, chapter 2). This creation of a desire for religious communications is a complex process in which schools, communications media of all sorts, commodity manufacturers and political institutions participate. Information technologies (including the decidedly low-tech written sign) continuously feed off one another: books refer to street signs, newspapers refet to television programmes, school textbooks refer to radio broadcasting, television programmes refer to the Qur'an, advertising murals refer to television campaigns. As we saw above, one medium occasionally becomes another, as when a magazine photograph becomes a sign taped to the wall. New information technologies have blanketed urban Egypt since the 1870s, when the first Arabic-language newspapers were founded, and their influence only spread when radio came in the mid-1930s (in part the result of a propaganda war between Britain and fascist Italy over Arabic broadcasts to North Africa). In 1938 a British professor at Cairo University wrote in a confidential report to the BBC that Cyberspace, at least as met on the Internet, occupies such a social space between 'hard' institutions and 'soft' culture. Its advocates register this liminal character as 'virtual community' (Rheingold 1993), which is intimate and distant at the same time, intensely engaging but along a narrow slice of life. Well enough; but the character of this community, and of the social space of the Internet, is built in the first instance on properties and practices of communication. What we see in the spaces that focus on the identities of the participants are mixed discourses, crossover talk between domains (notably science, religion, social and cultural issues), borrowing and trafficking in alternative forms and bases of authority and legitimacy. Some discourses have 'migrated' to the Internet from pre-existing comrAunities and sites; others emerge there as its denizens to utilize the potentials of near-instantaneous, near-global and, to them, nearly free communication to reach out and find each other -including, just as crucially, the unlike-as well as the like-minded.
The social organization of this world is rooted in the worlds which gave rise to the Internet as a tool of scientists and engineers seeking quick and open access to others like themselves. It embodies their values on speed, reach, openness, quick response and the emergence that they seek in the research they communicate. Responding to these needs, the Internet grew not just technologically but sociologically as the forms and occasions of collaboration grew to include additional interests brought by its users. Like the earlier subscription listservs, Usenet newsgroups for open discussion were developed in response to these needs, and often in 'peripheral' places, for which these devices erase time, distance and other marginalizing factors or scientific-industrial social geography. The Internet first organizes this space according to the values built into it.
First among these are the narrowing of communication, and obliterating of features of identity other than what they communicate. Each group and list tends to have a core of active participants, around
